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I. INTRODUCTION
When the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission promulgat-
ed the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines in 1980, it significantly changed
criminal sentencing practices by demanding greater uniformity.' This
quest for uniformity in sentencing destroyed the plenary sentencing dis-
2cretion that judges once enjoyed. However, in an attempt to retain flexi-
bility within the guidelines scheme, the Commission created "departures,"
which allow judges to depart from the guidelines' presumptive sentences
when particular defendants have displayed atypical behavior.3 Although
1. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES & COMMENTARY § 1 (1996).
2. Under the indeterminate sentencing system, judges could impose any
sentence from probation to the maximum prison term that the law authorized.
Richard S. Frase, The Uncertain Future of Sentencing Guidelines, 12 LAW & INEQ.J. 1, 7
(1993); see also infra notes 6-9 and accompanying text (describing indeterminate
sentencing in greater detail).
3. See DALE G. PARENT, STRUCTURING CRIMINAL SENTENCES: THE EVOLUTION OF
1
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the Commission considered many factors which would warrant a depar-
ture from the guidelines, it did not address whether plea agreements con-
stitute sufficient justification for departure.
In State v. Givens, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered whether
compliance with the terms of a plea agreement warrants a departure from
the guidelines.4 The supreme court, in reversing the court of appeals' de-
cision, held that a plea agreement provided sufficient justification for de-
parting from the guidelines - provided the defendant enters into the plea
agreement voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.5
This Case Note explores the issues that arise when a sentencing court
departs from the guidelines based upon a plea agreement. Part II of this
Case Note discusses indeterminate sentencing, the promulgation of Min-
nesota's sentencing guidelines, and plea agreements as a justification for
departing from the guidelines. Next, Part III sets forth the facts and pro-
cedural history of Givens. Part IV analyzes the effects the decision will
have on the criminal justice system. This Case Note concludes that Givens
will create disparities in sentencing. In turn, the decision will reduce a de-
fendant's incentive to enter into a plea bargain, thus burdening already
strained judicial resources. Finally, this Case Note argues that the Com-
mission should formulate plea agreement guidelines to shield against the
negative ramifications of Givens.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Indeterminate Sentencing
From the nineteenth century until the late 1970s, all of this nation's
6states had "indeterminate" criminal sentencing systems. A typical inde-
terminate system called for the sentencing judge to impose a minimum
and maximum incarceration term upon the offender based on the judge's
opinion of how long it would take to rehabilitate the criminal.7 Under
this system, judges were given broad discretion to determine minimum
and maximum incarceration terms.8 After the offender served his or her
MINNESOTA'S SENTENCING GUIDELINES 122-23 (Daniel J. Freed ed., 1988); see also
infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (discussing aggravating and mitigating
factors).
4. 544 N.W.2d 774, 777 (Minn. 1996), rev'k No. C2-95-36, 1995 WL 130621
(Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 1995).
5. See id.
6. See ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 1.3, at9 (2d ed. 1991).
7. See id. The indeterminate system is based on a rehabilitative rationale -
i.e., the primary purpose of incarceration is to rehabilitate, not punish, offenders.
See id. § 4.1, at 70.
8. See THOMAS W. HUTCHINSON ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 10.1, at 755 (2d ed. 1994). For example, under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1994), a
judge could sentence a bank robber to prison for zero to 20 years. See
[Vol. 23
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minimum term, a parole board determined if the offender had under-
gone sufficient rehabilitation. When the offender was able to substantiate
that he or she had reformed, the individual was released before serving
his or her maximum term. 9
Despite its long history, the indeterminate system received a great
deal of criticism during the mid-1970s.' ° Critics perceived two primary
flaws in the system. One was the glaring disparity in the lengths of of-
fenders' prison sentences, which stemmed from the broad discretion
vested in sentencing courts. The other major drawback was the uncer-
tainty that resulted from a parole commission's authority to reduce sen-
tences arbitrarily. 2 These criticisms led most states to reexamine their
criminal sentencing practices and to develop the systems employed to-
day.
13
B. The Emergence of Sentencing Guidelines
In response to the aforementioned criticisms, states began to adopt
determinative sentencing systems in the late 1970s. 14 Determinative sen-
tencing systems differ from indeterminate systems in two important ways.1
5
First, the sentencing judge imposes a single term instead of a minimum
and maximum term as in the indeterminate system.' 6 Second, there is no
HurTCHINSON ETAL., supra, § 10.1, at 757 n.3. "In considering what sentence to im-
pose, the judge was to consider 'the fullest information possible concerning the
defendant's life and characteristics.'" See id. § 10.1, at 755 (citing William v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241, 247, reh'g denied, 338 U.S. 841 (1949)).
9. See CAMPBELL, supra note 6, § 1.3, at 9.
10. See generally 2 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 1-4 (Al-
fred Blumstein et al. eds., 1983) (noting criticism of sentencing practices); FRANCIS
A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 7-12 (1981) (summarizing the
intellectual debate of the 1970s regarding sentencing and punishment). But cf
DAVID FOGEL, ".... WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF... ": THE JUSTICE MODEL FOR
CORRECTIONS 238-60 (2d ed. 1979) (arguing for a slight modification, rather than
a complete overhaul, of the indeterminate system).
11. See Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 896 (1990). Studies have re-
vealed large disparities in the sentences given to similarly-situated defendants. See
id. at 895. For example, a study of judges from the Second Circuit indicated that
for a case where a defendant was convicted of nine counts of extortionate credit
transactions and related tax violations but had no previous similar convictions, the
disparity of sentences from those judges surveyed ranged from twenty years im-
prisonment and a $65,000 fine to three years imprisonment and no fine. See
ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING
STUDY 6 (1974).
12. See Nagel, supra note 11, at 896.
13. See CAMPBELL, supra note 6, § 1.3, at 9-13.
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subsequent parole board decision to release the prisoner earlier than the
imposed term, since determinate sentencing eliminates the need for pa-
role boards.
1 7
1. Development in Minnesota
Minnesota pioneered the determinative sentencing system. 8 In
1978, the Minnesota Legislature created a specialized administrative body,
the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, to develop and im-
plement a new criminal sentencing system. 9 The Commission's primary
goal was to establish a system that would produce greater uniformity in
sentencing, thereby assuring that similarly-situated individuals, convicted
of the same crime, would receive comparable sentences. °
The Commission began working in the spring of 1978.2 The first is-
sue the Commission had to resolve was how to develop the guidelines.22
The emerging literature suggested two methods - the descriptive method
and the prescriptive method.2 3 The first alternative, the descriptive meth-
od, predicates future sentences on past practices. 4 This model's premise
is that any disparity in sentencing practices will quickly dissipate by bring-
ing future sentences close to the model practice of the past.25 The de-
scriptive system would "embody undesirable as well as desirable features of
past sentencing practice [s]. Under the second alternative, the prescrip-
tive method, the designated body establishes guidelines for future sen-
tences by referring to those values it identifies as important. 27 Strictly ap-
plying these guideline standards would reduce sentence disparity.8
Ultimately, the Commission decided to use the prescriptive method
in formulating the guidelines. 29 Recognizing "[t]he prescriptive guide-
17. See id. § 4.4, at 78-79. "Only credit for time served, good time, and work
time, can reduce the term imposed on sentencing day." Id.
18. See id. § 4.8, at 90.
19. See Frase, supra note 2, at 9. Judges, law enforcement and correctional
officials, prosecution and defense attorneys, and members of the public composed
the Commission. See Susan E. Martin, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: Sentencing
Guidelines in Pennsylvania and Minnesota, in 2 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING, supra note
10, at 265, 276.
20. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES & COMMENTARY § I (1996).
21. See PARENT, supra note 3, at 28.





27. See PARENT, supra note 3, at 34.
28. See id. at 35.
29. See id. at 37. The Commission developed the guidelines using an open
access method, whereby any interested members of the community could attend
Commission meetings. See id. at 46. The open access method gave the public and
(Vol. 23
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lines are dynamic rather than static," the Commission agreed to "assess
the goals in operation and modify them as deemed necessary." '° In early
1980, the newly-formulated guidelines, using the prescriptive method,
were put into operation. 1
2. How the Guidelines Function
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines determine whether a con-
victed felon should be sentenced to prison or probation, and if so, for how
long.3 2 The severity of the convicted offense and the nature of the felon's
prior criminal history are the two major variables that are used to derive a
convicted felon's presumptive sentence.3 ' The felon's offense and crimi-
nal history each receive a numerical score . The judge then locates these
two numbers on a sentencing grid, which provides the presumptive sen-
tence.
The guidelines allow the sentencing judge to depart from the pre-
sumptive sentence only if there are mitigating3 or aggravating factors
members of the criminal justice system an opportunity to present information and
to influence policy-making. See id. In addition, the open access process "informed
the public and enhanced the acceptability of the emerging guidelines." Id. at 48.
30. Id. at 35.
31. See id. at 28. Many other states, and the federal government, have devel-
oped and/or adopted criminal sentencing systems similar to Minnesota's. See
Frase, supra note 2, at 1 n.1; see also ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.55.125, 12.55.175 (1996);
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-90-801 to -804 (Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 6581
(1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 921.0001, 921.001 (West 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-
4701 to -4728 (1995 & Supp. 1996); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 643C (Michie Supp.
1996); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 279, app. §§ 1-3 (West Supp. 1996); MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. §§ 769.33-.34 (West Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. app. § 244 (Supp. 1997);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 558.019 (Vernon Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-18-130 to
-132 (1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1340.13 to .17 (Supp. 1996); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 181.24-25 (1994 & 1995 Supp.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 991A (West
Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 137.667, 137.669, 137.671 (Supp. 1996); 204 PA.
CODE § 304 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-26-10 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-35-210 (Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 17-237 to -238 (Michie
Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.040 (West Supp. 1997).
32. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES & COMMENTARY § V (1996) (depicting
the sentencing guidelines grid).
33. Id.
34. Id. To determine a defendant's offense score, the judge consults the "Of-
fense Severity Reference Table," which groups felonies according to their severity.
Id. The individual offender's criminal history is of secondary importance to the
severity of the offense. See id. § II.B.01 commentary at 5. The criminal history
score takes into account the individual's prior felony record, custody status at the
time of the current offense, prior misdemeanor record, and, for young adult fel-
ons, prior juvenile record. See id. § II.B.1-4 commentary at 6-17. The criminal his-
tory score is computed by allocating "points" to these categories. See id. § II.B at 5.
35. State v. Hennum is a case where mitigating factors justified a downward
departure from the guidelines' presumptive sentence. 441 N.W.2d 793 (Minn.
1997]
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present. The guidelines provide a non-exclusive list of mitigating and ag-
gravating factors which may warrant a departure. A "downward disposi-
tional departure" occurs when the guidelines indicate the defendant
should be sentenced to prison, but the judge sentences the defendant to
probation." Similarly, an "upward durational departure" would occur
when the guidelines indicate that the defendant should be imprisoned for
thirty-six months, but the judge instead sentences the defendant to forty-
eight months.3 9
C. Plea Bargains as a Reason for Departure from the Guidelines
Even though the guidelines' list of departure factors is extensive and
thorough, it does not address whether plea bargains are sufficient justifi-
cation for departing from the presumptive sentence. The Commission
did not begin working on departure standards until late in the process,
1989). In Hennum, the defendant was convicted of second-degree felony murder
in the shooting death of her husband, Id. at 794. Over the course of the defen-
dant's marriage, she had been physically and mentally abused by the victim. Id. at
795. On the night of the murder, the victim came home drunk and physically
abused the defendant. Id. at 795-96. The supreme court reduced the defendant's
sentence from 102 months to 54 months, stating that the repeated physical abuse
mitigated the defendant's culpability. Id. at 801.
36. State v. Schantzen is a case where aggravating factors justified an upward
departure from the guidelines' presumptive sentence. 308 N.W.2d 484 (Minn.
1981). In Schantzen, the defendant, who was convicted of aggravated robbery, re-
ceived the maximum 20-year term instead of the presumptive sentence of 40
months in prison. Id. at 485-86. The trial court justified the departure because
just before fleeing the scene of the robbery, the defendant sprayed a chemical irri-
tant in the victims' faces while they lay handcuffed on the floor. Id. The supreme
court concluded that the victims were treated with particular cruelty because the
defendant's conduct "was of a kind not usually associated with the commission of
the offense in question." Id. at 487.
37. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES & COMMENTARY § II.D.2.a-b (1996). The
listed mitigating factors include: (1) whether the victim was an aggressor in the
incident; (2) whether the offender played a minor or passive role; (3) whether the
offender became involved under circumstances of coercion or duress; (4) whether
the offender lacked substantial capacity for judgment because of physical or men-
tal impairment; and (5) other substantial grounds that tend to excuse or mitigate
the offender's culpability, although not amounting to a defense. Id. § II.D.2.a.
The listed aggravating factors include: (1) whether the victim's vulnerability
was known or should have been known by the offender; (2) whether the victim was
treated with particular cruelty; (3) whether the victim was injured; (4) whether the
offense was a "major economic offense"; (5) whether the offense was a major con-
trolled substance offense; (6) whether the offender committed, for hire, a crime
against the person; (7) whether the offender is a "patterned sex offender"; and (8)
whether the offender committed the crime as part of a group of three or more
persons who all actively participated in the crime. Id. § II.D.2.b.
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because it found departure issues difficult to consolidate . In particular,
the Commission found that the plea agreement issue created a great deal
of controversy. The Commission recognized that, on one hand, plea
agreements play an integral part in the criminal justice system.4' On the
other hand, plea agreements have the potential to subvert the guidelines'
purpose of like sentences for like offenses. 42 Therefore, the Commission
declined to make any changes regarding the plea bargaining process in
the initial guidelines.43 The Commission thought it was best first to imple-
ment the guidelines and then to study plea agreements within the guide-
lines scheme." The Commission, in effect, deferred to the courts on the
issue of whether plea agreements warrant departures from the guidelines.
Historically, Minnesota courts have not permitted plea bargains to
serve as a justification for departing from the guidelines.45 In State v. Gar-
cia, the state supreme court addressed for the first time whether compli-
ance with the terms of a plea agreement warrants a departure from the
guidelines." The court held that
40. See PARENT, supra note 3, at 168.
41. See id. at 209.
42. See id.
43. See Martin, supra note 19, at 281. It is a difficult task to draft plea agree-
ment guidelines which are both meaningful and enforceable. See Richard S. Frase,
Sentencing Reform in Minnesota, Ten Years After: Reflections on Dale G. Parent's Structur-
ing Criminal Sentences: The Evolution of Minnesota's Sentencing Guidelines, 75 MINN. L.
REv. 727, 752 (1991). The task of drafting plea agreement guidelines requires a
large database. Such databases did not exist in 1980, see id., and do not exist today,
Telephone Interview with Debra Dailey, Director, Minnesota Sentencing Guide-
lines Commission (Nov. 19,1996).
44. See Martin, supra note 19, at 281. A thorough discussion of plea bargain-
ing is beyond the scope of this Case Note. For an in-depth study of the plea bar-
gaining process, see generally Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History,
79 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1979). For a practical guide to plea bargaining, see gener-
ally William L. Gardner & David S. Rifidnd, A Basic Guide to Plea Bargaining, CRIM.
JUST., Summer 1992, at 14.
45. See e.g., State v. Garcia, 302 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 1981) (holding that a
negotiated plea purportedly concerning the sentence to be imposed "does not
create a 'substantial and compelling' circumstance which may be relied upon as
justifying departure from the guidelines"), overruled in part by State v. Givens, 544
N.W.2d 774, 777 n.4 (Minn. 1996); State v. Pearson, 479 N.W.2d 401, 404-05
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Pendzimas, 379 N.W.2d 247, 248 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986); State v. Theison, 363 N.W.2d 867, 869 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
46. 302 N.W.2d at 647. Garcia entered into a plea negotiation with the
prosecutor after his arrest for forcing a woman into his car at gunpoint, kidnap-
ping her, and sexually assaulting her for two hours. Id. at 645. He agreed to plead
guilty to kidnapping, and in exchange, the prosecutor dropped a second charge of
criminal sexual conduct and recommended that the court impose a sentence of
no more than 50 months. Id. The kidnapping charge carried a presumptive sen-
tence of 26 months probation. See id. After the judge sentenced Garcia to 45
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an attempt such as this by the parties to limit sentence duration does
not create a substantial and compelling circumstance which may be re-
lied upon as justifying a departure from the [gluidelines. Only the
court, acting in accordance with the [g]uidelines, and not the parties,
47has the authority to determine the appropriate sentence.
Courts followed the Garcia precedent from 1981 through 1995.4 However,
in 1996, the Minnesota Supreme Court departed from Garcia and its
progeny in State v. Givens.4
III. STATE V. GIVENS
A. The Facts
In December 1992, Steven Givens robbed seventy-four-year-old Clara
Gullikson.' Pursuant to a plea agreement with a Hennepin County
prosecutor, Givens pled guilty to the charge of first-degree burglary." In
exchange, the prosecutor dismissed an additional charge of simple rob-
bery and submitted a sentencing recommendation to the district court.
5 2
The court sentenced Givens to ninety-six months, two times the manda-
tory presumptive sentence for first-degree burglary under the guidelines.
The court stayed execution of the sentence and placed Givens on proba-
tion for seven years.54 The imposed sentence was thus a "downward dispo-
47. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
48. See supra note 45 (citing cases).
49. 544 N.W.2d 774 (Minn. 1996).
50. Id. at 775. Givens entered Gullikson's apartment building, signed in at
the security desk, and falsely stated he had videotapes to deliver. Id. The record
contained no evidence as to why Givens selected Gullikson's apartment. Id. When
Gullikson answered the door, Givens grabbed her cane, pushed her to the floor,
and took her purse. Id.
51. Id. Minnesota's first-degree burglary statute provides in pertinent part:
Whoever enters a building without consent and with intent to commit a
crime, or enters a building without consent and commits a crime while in
the building, commits burglary in the first degree and may be sentenced
to imprisonment for not more than 20 years or to payment of a fine of
not more the $35,000 or both, if ... the burglar assaults a person within
the building or on the building's appurtenant property.
MINN. STAT. § 609.582, subd. 1 (c) (1996).
52. Givens, 544 N.W.2d at 775. The prosecutor recommended that the district
court depart upward from the presumptive sentence mandated by the guidelines,
but stay the sentence and order Givens to enter chemical dependency treatment.
Id.
53. See State v. Givens, No. C2-95-36, 1995 WL 130621, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App.
Mar. 28, 1995). The form of first-degree burglary committed by Givens had an of-
fense severity score of seven and Givens' criminal history score was zero. Thus,
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sitional departure" and an "upward durational departure. " 5u In both types
of departures, the district court must provide written reasons for forgoing
the presumptive sentence."
In 1994, Givens violated his probation, and the district court imposed
Givens' ninety-six-month stayed sentence . The Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals reversed the district court's decision, 8 concluding there were no ag-
gravating factors justifying the upward durational departure."' Appealing
the intermediate court's decision, the State asked the Minnesota Supreme
Court to establish a rebuttable presumption, whereby a defendant who
has agreed to a sentence departure as a part of a plea bargain is deemed
to have waived his or her right to be sentenced under the guidelines.
6
0
B. The Court's Holding and Reasoning
In Givens, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a plea agreement
is sufficient justification for departing from the guidelines' presumptive
55. Givens, 544 N.W.2d at 775; see also supra notes 38-39 and accompanying
text.
56. See Givens, 544 N.W.2d at 775. The district court cited the victim's vulner-
ability due to age, an aggravating factor from the guidelines' non-exclusive list, as
the reason for the upward durational departure. Id. The district court did not
give a reason for the downward dispositional departure. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 776. Givens argued that the facts necessary to support the district
court's durational departure were absent in this case. See id. Givens asserted that
in order for the court to depart from the presumptive sentence based on an ag-
gravating factor, a defendant must take advantage of that factor. See id. at 775.
59. See id. The court of appeals held that "in order for vulnerability due to
age to be an aggravating factor, a defendant must exploit that vulnerability to
commit the offense." Id. No evidence suggested that Givens knew Gullikson was
74 years old when he chose to knock on her door, that he would not have at-
tempted to steal from anyone who opened the door. Thus, the court reasoned, it
could not assume Givens "exploited" Gullikson's age in order to grab her purse.
See id. An upward durational departure was not warranted, because aggravating
circumstances did not exist. See id.
60. Id. The State argued that it is disingenuous for a defendant to agree to a
particular sentence as part of a plea agreement and subsequently challenge the
validity of that sentence. Petitioner's Brief at 6, State v. Givens, 544 N.W.2d 744
(Minn. 1996) (No. C2-95-36). Therefore, the State proposed "that when a defen-
dant freely and voluntarily enters into a plea which encompasses an agreement on
sentencing... [the] agreement [sh]ould create a rebuttable ... presumption of
the validity of that sentence." Id. at 7. Even though the State's argument may
make sense, the negative consequences of such a presumption far outweigh any
concerns of disingenuity. See infra notes 68-85 and accompanying text. Further-
more, the court does not have the authority to decide whether or not plea agree-
ments are sufficient justification for departing from the guidelines. Only the legis-
lature, through the sentencing commission, has the authority to make this
decision. See PARENT, supra note 3, at 242.
1997]
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sentencing scheme. 61 The court first reasoned that "it has long been set-
tled law that courts will honor a defendant's lawful 'intentional relin-
quishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." 62 In addition,
the court recognized that defendants waive their right to ajury trial by en-
tering into plea agreements. 63 The court saw "no reason not to allow" a
defendant to relinquish another right pursuant to a plea agreement.6
Therefore, the court concluded, a defendant who enters into a plea bar-
gain may relinquish his rights under the guidelines, and no further justifi-
cation for departure is needed.65
After concluding that a plea agreement may extinguish a defendant's
rights under the guidelines, the court made a qualifying statement: a plea
agreement will operate as a waiver and justification for departure only if
the defendant has been advised of: (1) his or her right to be sentenced
under the guidelines, (2) the possibility of departure if the plea agree-
ment is signed, and (3) the opportunity to consult counsel. 66 However,
the court never inquired into the propriety of Givens' plea agreement, be-
cause it found aggravating circumstances to support the trial court's de-
67parture.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE GIVS DECISION
The Givens decision is the first case in Minnesota to allow a departure
from the guidelines based on a defendant's decision to enter into a plea
agreement. This decision is troubling for two reasons. First, Givens is in-
consistent with the guidelines' purpose of like sentences for like offenses. 6
Second, Givens will discourage defendants from entering into plea agree-
ments. Consequently, a decrease in plea agreements will strain judicial
69resources.
61. Givens, 544 N.W.2d at 777.
62. Id. (quotingJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
63. Id.; see also Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Minn. 1989) (explaining
that a defendant who knowingly and understandingly enters into a plea agreement
waives his right to a jury trial); State v. Ford, 397 N.W.2d 875, 880 (Minn. 1986)
(stating that a guilty plea by a defendant who is represented by counsel has tradi-
tionally operated, in Minnesota and in other jurisdictions, as a waiver of the right
to a jury trial); Saliterman v. State, 443 N.W.2d 841, 844 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding that a defendant who enters into a plea agreement may waive his right to
ajury trial).
64. Givens, 544 N.W.2d at 777.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. Specifically, the court concluded that the trial court acted reasonably
in departing upward from the guidelines, since Givens exploited the victim's vul-
nerability. Id. at 776.
68. See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 2:3
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A. Return to Disparity in Sentences
The Givens decision will increase disparity in sentences because it is,
in effect, a return to indeterminate sentencing in plea agreement situa-
tions. A pre-guidelines judge was not required to provide reasons for a
sentence and was free to impose any sentence he or she desired within a
70broad statutory range. In contrast, under the guidelines, a judge must
find either an aggravating or mitigating factor before departing from the
guidelines. 7' The Givens court, however, removed the requirement that
judges must provide a reason for departing from the guidelines when a
defendant enters into a plea agreement.72 Therefore, under Givens, a
judge once again may impose any sentence desired simply by stating that
the defendant waived his or her rights under the guidelines.
In sum, Givens restores a judge's discretionary power to that of a pre-
guidelines judge, who was not required to give reasons for his or her sen-
tence and who was constrained only by broad statutory penalty ranges.
The disparity seen in sentences during pre-guidelines practice will return.
As the disparity in sentencing increases, the primary goal of the guidelines
- like sentences for like offenses73 - will be completely subverted.
B. StrainingJudicial Resources
Not only will Givens subvert the purpose of the guidelines, but it will
also reduce the total number of defendants who are willing to enter into
plea agreements. Thus, Givens will further strain a system that is already
struggling to meet the demands placed upon it.74 A defendant who enters
into a plea bargain is a rational decision-maker seeking to minimize his
75sentence and avoid risk. As a rational actor, a defendant evaluates a pro-
70. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text; infra notes 81-82 and accompa-
nying text.
71. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES & COMMENTARY § II.D.2.a-b (1996); see
also supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. Evidence suggests that the guide-
lines have successfully reduced sentencing disparity. See, e.g., Frase, supra note 43,
at 736-37.
72. See State v. Givens, 544 N.W.2d 774, 777 (Minn. 1996).
73. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES & COMMENTARY § I (1996) (stating the
purpose and principles of the guidelines).
74. Plea bargaining is often supported by economists, who believe that it is a
socially efficient method of administering criminal justice. See, e.g., RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw § 21.7 (4th ed. 1992) (noting that plea nego-
tiation resolves disputes more cheaply than litigation); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Criminal Procedure As a Market System, 12J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 297-98 (1983) (arguing
that the imposition of restrictions on plea bargaining reduces the savings gained
by avoiding trials). But cf Stanley A. Cohen & Anthony N. Doob, Public Attitudes to
Plea Bargaining, 32 CraM. L. Q. 85, 95-97 (1990) (discussing a 1988 survey revealing
that most adults disapprove of plea bargaining).
75. See Tung Yin, Comment, Not a Rotten Carrot: Using Charges Dismissed Pursu-
19971
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posed plea bargain by calculating the punishment expected under the
plea agreement. 6 The defendant then compares the plea agreement pun-
ishment with the expected punishment from a guilty verdict, multiplied by
the probability that he would be convicted if the case went to trial. If the
plea agreement leads to a more certain, less severe punishment, the de-
fendant probably will plead guilty.78 Givens, however, eliminates the ele-
ment of certainty, thus raising the defendant's risk.
Under Givens, a defendant's incentive to enter into a plea bargain
will decrease because the judge's broad sentencing discretion makes the
actual sentence uncertain.79 For example, the defendant possibly could
receive the statutory maximum sentence, and the judge would not have to
provide a reason for the sentence. If, on the other hand, a defendant
proceeds to trial, he or she can easily calculate the likely sentence by re-
ferring to the guidelines. Furthermore, under the guidelines, the prob-
ability of receiving the statutory maximum sentence is small. Only if ex-
treme aggravating circumstances exist would a court impose such a
sentence. The judge would have to detail the circumstances before sen-
tencing a defendant to the statutory maximum. ° Therefore, a rational de-
fendant, trying to avoid risk, likely would proceed to trial, because the cal-
culated sentence is quite certain and the possibility of a severe sentence is
small.
Ultimately, the decrease in incentives to enter a plea bargain will
have a severe effect on judicial resources. "Because nearly ninety percent
of all criminal cases are settled in plea bargains. . . , a small decrease in
the number of pleas would represent a proportionately much larger increase
ant to a Plea Agreement in Sentencing Under the Federal Guidelines, 83 CAL. L. REv. 419,
458 (1995). "Rationality consists of three characteristics: (1) stable preferences,
(2) constrained choices, and (3) self-maximization." Id. at 457 n.274 (citing
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 234 (1988)). "Thus ration-
ality merely assumes that the defendant knows his preferences and acts to achieve
the best results for himself." Id.
76. See id. at 458.
77. See id.
78. See id. In debating whether to accept plea bargains, defendants also con-
sider other relevant factors, such as defense costs, the time involved for a trial, and
time spent in pretrial detention. Steven Klepper et al., Discrimination in the Crimi-
nal Justice System: A Critical Appraisal of the Literature, in 2 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING,
supra note 10, at 55, 83. Although these other factors play a role in a defendant's
decision to enter into a plea agreement, all of the aforementioned factors are sec-
ondary to the defendant's primary objective - reducing the severity of his or her
sentence. See id.
79. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text (describing the wide discretion
afforded judges under the indeterminate sentencing system).
80. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (discussing the circum-
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in the number of trials."8' Although the extent of the decrease in plea
bargains cannot be predicted with certainty, even a subtle increase in the
number of trials would produce troublesome effects that would reverber-
ate throughout the system.8'
The Givens decision poses a threat to judicial resources and to the
guidelines' purpose of like sentences for like offenses. These threats must
be addressed. The Commission has the authority to amend the guidelines
and to correct the negative implications of Givens through the exercise of
its delegated police power.8 ' The Commission should therefore formulate
plea agreement guidelines providing that plea bargains are insufficient
84justification for departure from presumptive sentences. If, however, the
Commission feels insufficient data exist to formulate such guidelines,8 5 it
should, at the very least, require judges to provide written explanations
81. Eric R. Komitee, Bargains Without Benefits: Do the Sentencing Guidelines Per-
mit Upward Departures to Redress the Dismissal of Charges Pursuant to Plea Bargains?, 70
N.Y.U. L. REv. 166, 193 (1995).
82. See id. A slight change in the number of plea bargains could have a sig-
nificant effect on the judicial system. See Warren E. Burger, The State of the Judiciary,
56 A.B.A.J. 929, 931 (1970) ("A reduction from 90 percent to 80 percent in guilty
pleas requires the assignment of twice the judicial manpower and facilities -
judges, court reporters, bailiffs, clerks, jurors and courtrooms. A reduction to 70
percent trebles this demand.").
Suppose there are 100 convictions in a given court. See id. According to sta-
tistics, 90 would be settled by plea bargain and 10 by trial. See id. If the percentage
of guilty pleas drops by 10%, then of the 100 convictions, 81 would be settled by
plea bargain and 19 by trial. See id. The number of trials nearly would double
from 10 to 19. See id. Statistics collected by the federal government place this hy-
pothetical into context. In 1992, there were 893,630 state court felony convictions.
See BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS - 1995, at 489 (1996). Of those convictions, plea bargains accounted
for 820,662 of the dispositions while only 72,968 went to trial. If the percentage of
guilty pleas drops by 10%, then of the 820,662 convictions in 1992, 738,595 would
have been settled by plea bargain while courts would have had to hold 155,034 tri-
als. See id. Thus, what may, at first glance, appear to produce a mere 10% increase
in the number of trials would more than double the number of trials (from 72,978
to 155,034) held annually in this country. See id. This effect would certainly
evaporate thejudiciary's precious resources.
83. See PARENT, supra note 3, at 242. The Commission specifically chose a
prescriptive method in formulating the guidelines, so it could amend them in re-
sponse to case law. See id.
84. See id. at 217. Parent argues that plea agreement guidelines are feasible
and useful. Id. Parent also suggests that states should give their commissions
enough time to formulate plea agreement guidelines at the outset. Id. at 209.
Federal sentencing guidelines incorporate language that discusses plea agree-
ments. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B (1995). While no states cur-
rently have explicit plea agreement guidelines, the "Washington legislature [has]
required its sentencing commission to promulgate charging and plea bargaining
guidelines to govern prosecutorial discretion." PARENT, supra note 3, at 179 n.2.
85. See Frase, supra note 43, at 752.
1997]
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when they depart from the guidelines' presumptive sentences under the
guise of a plea agreement.
V. CONCLUSION
The sentencing system that Minnesota pioneered in the late 1970s
will lose all meaning under the Givens decision. Givens will increase dis-
parity in sentences by allowing plea agreements that are inconsistent with
the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. Givens will also decrease the num-
ber of defendants willing to enter into plea agreements, since a sentence
under the guidelines is more certain. Such a decrease in plea agreements
will seriously strain judicial resources.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission has the authority
to avert the negative ramifications of Givens. The Commission specifically
chose to employ a prescriptive sentencing system so it could amend the
guidelines in response to case law. The Commission should create plea
agreement guidelines which state that plea bargains alone cannot justify
departure from the guidelines' presumptive sentences - before the nega-
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